ACCESS(2)

NAME
access, eaccess - check accessibility of a file

LIBRARY
libc

SYNOPSIS
#include <unistd.h>
int
access(const char *path, int mode);
int
eaccess(const char *path, int mode);

DESCRIPTION
The access() and eaccess() system calls check the accessibility of the file named by the path argument for the access permissions indicated by the mode argument. The value of mode is either the bitwise-inclusive OR of the access permissions to be checked (R_OK for read permission, W_OK for write permission, and X_OK for execute/search permission), or the existence test (F_OK).

For additional information, see the File Access Permission section of intro(2).

The eaccess() system call uses the effective user ID and the group access list to authorize the request; the access() system call uses the real user ID in place of the effective user ID, the real group ID in place of the effective group ID, and the rest of the group access list.

Even if a process's real or effective user has appropriate privileges and indicates success for X_OK, the file may not actually have execute permission bits set. Likewise for R_OK and W_OK.

RETURN VALUES

ERRORS
Access to the file is denied if:

[ENOTDIR]
    A component of the path prefix is not a directory.

[ENAMETOOLONG]
    A component of a pathname exceeded 255 characters, or an entire path name exceeded 1023 characters.

[ENOENT]
    The named file does not exist.

[ELOOP]
    Too many symbolic links were encountered in translating the pathname.

[EROFS]
    Write access is requested for a file on a read-only file system.

[ETXTBSY]
    Write access is requested for a pure procedure (shared text) file presently being executed.

[EACCES]
    Permission bits of the file mode do not permit the requested access, or search permission is denied on a component of the path prefix.

[EFAULT]
    The path argument points outside the process's allocated address space.

[EIO]
    An I/O error occurred while reading from or writing to the file system.

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The access() system call is a potential security hole due to race conditions and should never be used. Set-user-ID and set-group-ID applications should restore the effective user or group ID, and perform actions directly rather than use access() to simulate access checks for the real user or group ID. The eaccess() system call likewise may be subject to races if used inappropriately.

SEE ALSO
chmod(2), intro(2), stat(2)

STANDARDS
The access() system call is expected to conform to p1003.1-90.

HISTORY
The access() function appeared in AT&T UNIX.